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 Economics suggests that any money exiting an economy through the current account (a 
trade deficit) has to in turn come back through the capital account (foreign direct investment). In 
the current political climate in America instead of viewing the entirety of the balance of payments 
many pundits have instead decided to focus in on the trade deficit as the biggest threat to the 
American economy. This was reflected over the course of last year’s presidential campaign where 
in the first debate China was mentioned 11 times and Mexico was mentioned 6 times (Solis, 2016). 
This is hardly anything new in American politics with many presidential candidates vowing to 
scrap NAFTA and stop negotiating other free trade agreements for the past several election cycles 
(Amadeo, 2017). 
 However, with their finger on the pulse of the American electorate, one has to wonder if 
views on trade affect the ease of doing business for foreign companies trying to make acquisitions 
in America. Or do foreign companies just run in to the same issues that other American companies 
face when trying to acquire existing businesses in America? Would greater scrutiny on trade with 
countries that America runs trade deficits with lead to longer transaction closing times for 
companies from those countries? If trade is indeed a factor it will only be one of many issues and 
other factors pertaining to foreign policy or details of the deal itself will also play a factor. 
 This paper hopes to examine the relationship between the amount of time it takes for a 
transaction to close and many of the previously alluded to variables including the deal size, 
industry related factors, trade, and some foreign policy considerations. Does it take longer for 
foreign companies to close acquisitions than their American counterparts and do factors pertaining 




 A lot has been said of a company’s financial performance after an acquisition has been 
completed and the various factors that can be detrimental or beneficial to a transaction post-merger. 
For example, in analysis of bank mergers it was found that dissimilarities in marketing and 
operational strategies were often detrimental to the successful financial outcome of a transaction 
(Ramaswamy, 1997). However, studying the potential variables that could impact the successful 
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and quick closing of an acquisition could also be helpful in determining whether or not certain 
deals are even worth pursuing in the first place. 
 Many other papers have looked at other factors pertaining to cross-border deals like societal 
institutions (Dikova et al, 2010), country risk and to/from emerging market acquisitions (Zhou et 
al, 2016). However, many of these papers have been entirely or partly devoted to whether or not 
these deals even close at all. 
 In their 2010 paper on cross-border acquisition abandonment and completion Dikova et al 
explored the factors that could delay or derail international acquisitions in the international 
business service industry. They noted through their research that firms still abandon up to 25% of 
all announced acquisition attempts and this can sometimes lead to a costly outcome despite the 
fact that no purchase was completed. A notable example of these potential costs was displayed in 
the $1B breakup fee that Aetna had to pay to Humana after terminating their merger agreement in 
2017 (Japsen, 2017). The authors attempted to determine several factors that could end up being 
deal-breakers in announced international M&A acquisitions. The authors also looked at how firms 
could benefit from organizational learning and noted how some corporate acquirers had turned 
acquiring companies into a science. The notable example was how GE Capital could effectively 
integrate most of its acquisitions within 100 days (Ashkenas et al, 1998). The literature examined 
by the authors suggested that this learning curve played a crucial role in determining the successful 
integration of an acquisition after deal closing and wanted to extrapolate whether or not learning 
from previous acquisitions brought any benefit to shortening the intermediary period between 
when deals were announced and when they closed. A shorter intermediary period could potentially 
reduce direct costs like devoting a team to communicating with the target company, regulators and 
other stakeholders. It could also reduce other indirect costs of missing out on other investment 
opportunities and acquisitions that could also be lucrative for example. 
 Dikova et al decided to focus on IB services as it typically involves areas like accounting, 
advertisement, and management services where “national formal and informal institutional factors 
to play a greater role than in industries where business transactions involve an exchange of mainly 
tangibles.” The authors found support that formal and informal institutional differences had a 
negative impact on the likelihood that a deal would close. However, the authors only found partial 
support for their hypotheses that formal and informal institutional differences between acquirer 
and target countries positively increased the amount of time it took for a deal to close. Similarly, 
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the authors found evidence that learning experience reduced the impact of formal and informal 
institutions on the likelihood of deal completion, but only found partial support for learning 
experience reducing the impact of formal and informal institutions on the amount of time it took 
for completed deals to close. 
 The previously examined paper focused exclusively on cross-border acquisitions between 
already developed economies. However, in acquisitions between emerging markets and developed 
economies the acquirer or target could be quite different in terms of their experience in dealing 
with the regulatory frameworks of the more developed economies or even in terms of their 
ownership structure. In their 2015 paper, Zhou et al looked at the likelihood of completion between 
acquisitions where the acquirer was from an emerging market vs. where the acquirer was from 
another a country and trying to make an acquisition in the emerging market. Their paper 
specifically looked at the 4 BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). In terms of deal 
completion likelihood, the results were massively different between the two papers. Zhou et al 
observed a failure rate of 32.5% vs. the 18% that was observed by Dikova et al in their paper. 
 In their paper Zhou et al set out to test whether distance in country law/regulation and 
distance in country risk were more or less negative for inbound than for outbound M&As for 
emerging market companies. Similar to the paper by Dikova et al, the authors tested whether or 
not firms benefited from past success and failure experience in both inbound outbound M&A from 
the aforementioned emerging markets. Finally, the authors also looked at whether the affects of 
the stake sought in the target and the form of payment had different affects on inbound and 
outbound M&A from emerging markets. 
 Zhou et al in their extensive research and testing found that in most cases the likelihood of 
completion for inbound M&A to emerging markets was higher than the likelihood that outbound 
M&A would succeed. This implies that emerging markets are perhaps plagued by a negative image 
of foreignness when pursuing acquisitions in developed economies. However, as the distance 
between country regulatory and legal frameworks increases past a certain point that relationship 
becomes inverted. Also, since in developed economies the financial, legal, and economic systems 
are relatively predictable it could be a lot easier for an emerging market company to prepare to 
pursue an M&A opportunity in a more developed economy. Learning also played a big role in the 
likelihood that a deal would close with prior successes often being a harbinger for continued 
success and prior failures leading to continued failure for both acquirers from emerging and 
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developed economies. However, this affect was magnified for failures of companies from 
emerging markets. 
 For M&A inbound to an emerging market if a deal structure was all cash and the percentage 
sought was higher these both benefited the likelihood of a deal closing as the emerging economies 
were perceived to be seeking greater capital investment. However, the opposite tended to be true 
for deals pursued by acquirers from the emerging markets as they would run into antitrust and 
national security concerns. 
 The ownership structure of some of the firms from these emerging markets could have also 
played a negative role in their likelihood of success. For example, if the acquiring firm is a State-
Owned Enterprise (SOE) it may raise red flags in target countries as they may not want a foreign 
state to hold control over large parts of their economy. This would be especially true of the BRIC 
where the top ten companies represent up to 50% (Brazil), 81% (Russia), 59% (India), and 96% 
(China) of the weighted average of sales, assets and market vale in the top 10 firms of those 
economies (Büge et al, 2013). State-owned firms also tend to experience a lower likelihood of 
completing a cross-border deal and also take a longer time to complete successful deals than other 
foreign firms (Li et al, 2016). 
 The effect that bilateral trade has on deal completion likelihood and duration has also been 
looked at. It was found larger bilateral trade between countries both reduced the likelihood of an 
acquisition closing and also reduced the amount of time that that it took for acquisitions to be 
completed. However, neither of these results were statistically significant (Li et al, 2016). In the 
same paper the effect of being in the same industry was also explored and even though it not 
statistically significant for deal completion likelihood, it was shown to reduce deal completion 
times for foreign firms and that result was statistically significant. 
 The relationship between trade and foreign direct investment could also play a role in 
whether or not policy makers decide to intervene in cross-border acquisitions. It has been found 
that outward foreign direct investment is complementary to increasing exports from the nation of 
the acquirer (Liu and Graham, 1998). Seeing as outward foreign direct investment has been proven 
to increase exports the opposite could also be true that inward foreign direct investment is 
complementary to a host economy importing more, which could be disconcerting to a country that 
already has a large deficit with the trading partner in question. Inward acquisitions done through 
foreign direct investment do however also have some positive consequences for the host country. 
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There is a strong positive correlation between the share of employment in an industry held by 
foreign companies and increases in total factor productivity in those industries. However, the 
spillover effects of increased productivity usually take a longer time to spread to domestic firms 
(Haskel et al, 2002). The most notable example of this situation being the productivity gap between 
Japanese and American automakers, which seems to be closing in recent years (NBC, 2007). 
 The manner in which total factor productivity increases could also be of concern to 
lawmakers, manufacturing employment in America has declined by 5 million jobs since the turn 
of the century despite manufacturing output being at record highs (Nutting, 2016). Despite this 
fact politicians routinely blame trade with countries with cheaper labour for reducing 
manufacturing employment in America and weakening the middle class (Long, 2016). Clearly 
foreign direct investment has a large effect on both the originating and receiving economies, 
however policymakers typically frame economic competition through the lens of trade. Tariffs are 
just one of the levers that they have at their disposal to affect outcomes, however they can also 
take more time to review capital inflows or prevent them outright if they think it will hurt the 
American economy/people or be detrimental to national security. Trade and foreign investment 
relations with Japan are what ultimately led to the expanded powers given to the Committee on 






 One might expect that the closing time between domestic acquisitions and international 
acquisitions is statistically different, however, there are several factors could be to the benefit of 
either a foreign or domestic buyer. For example, if a foreign buyer is trying to just get a toe hold 
in America and it’s a new market for them they may be less likely to run the ire of America’s 
competition and antitrust regulators as opposed to a domestic buyer which might already have a 
share of the market and is trying to buy up the competition. A domestic buyer on the other hand 
would likely have greater knowledge of the processes required to close an acquisition in America 
and how to deal with the formal institutions and informal cultural nuances that could impede or 
slow down a takeover deal. 
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 Several factors could both be detrimental and beneficial to foreign acquisitions and 
domestic acquisitions, therefore it is expected that there would be no statistical difference between 
the closing times of domestic and foreign acquisitions. 
 
Deal Related Factors 
 
 A larger deal size is likely to be more complex and as a result take longer, regardless of 
whether the acquiring company is from a foreign country or if it’s American. The paper will also 
explore whether or not deals between companies within the same macro industry (as defined by 
Thomson Reuters) take longer to complete. Anti-trust laws in America are supposed to be geared 
to protect and promote competition within industries (Markham, 2006). Therefore, it could be 
assumed that trying to buy the competition (industry consolidation) would result in a greater 
likelihood of anti-trust action being pursued. As fighting an anti-trust proceeding takes time, one 
could assume the amount of time it would take for a deal to close would increase regardless of 
whether it is a cross border transaction or not. However, in prior literature, when same industry 
was used as a control variable, whether or not the companies operate in the same industry in foreign 
acquisitions was found to shorten acquisition times (Li et al, 2016). 
 Therefore, it is expected that deal size and the number of days it takes to complete a deal 
will be positively correlated with deal completion times. It is also expected that if both the 
acquiring and target company operate in the same industry the deal will take longer to complete 




 If America’s trade deficit is large with another country it should in turn receive a large 
amount of foreign direct investment (in the long run) from that country as companies that receive 
payment in American dollars will seek to invest those American dollars. This could in turn create 
an experience curve in countries that are running large deficits with America. This would result in 
companies from those countries learning what works and what doesn’t when pursuing the 
acquisition of a public company in America, thus reducing the amount of time that it would take 
to acquire an American company. 
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 Conversely if a lot of foreign direct investment is coming from one trading partner in 
particular this could lead to fears that companies from one foreign power could hold too much 
sway over large swathes of the American economy. This in turn could cause regulators to give 
acquisitions from America’s largest trading partners greater scrutiny, resulting in a lengthier time 
required to acquire an American company. In terms of bilateral trade there is little evidence to 
support this assumption in prior literature (Li et al, 2016), however negative sentiment connected 
to large trade deficits could create longer deal completion times. 
 America’s large trade deficit could also be reducing its’ competitiveness resulting in more 
jobs being shipped overseas. If a foreign buyer from a country that America holds a large trade 
deficit with is acquiring intellectual property, a brand, or expertise manufacturing and sourcing of 
the actual product would still be at an even greater risk of moving offshore. By importing more 
goods American companies can lose expertise and abandon factories, lowering the overall standard 
of living for its citizens (Amadeo, 2017). 
 Therefore, it is expected that companies from countries that hold large trade deficits with 
America will take longer to close acquisitions in America. 
 
Foreign Policy Considerations 
 
 Foreign policy considerations could be a double-edged sword for many foreign companies. 
In many ways it could make sense to put extra scrutiny on a company from a non-allied country 
trying to acquire assets in America. Concerns over whether or not a foreign power may gain some 
leverage over strategic resources or technologies or try to use its position in the American market 
to influence the public policy debate in the future could make authorities think twice before letting 
a deal proceed. 
 Alternatively, greater economic ties between non-allies and America could result in a 
continuation of peaceful relationships between America and countries with a lot of foreign direct 
investment in America. This would argue in favour of removing hurdles that could impact greater 
globalization regardless of whether or not acquiring companies are from allied or non-allied 
nations. Economic ties certainly do play a part in the pursuit of peace as was evidenced by the 
Former President Bill Clinton, whom when signing NAFTA said, “I believe we have made a 
decision now that will permit us to create an economic order in the world that will promote more 
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growth, more equality, better preservation of the environment, and a greater possibility of world 
peace” (Miller Center, 2017). 
 For companies from countries that are allied with America several factors could impact 
their incursions into the American economy that could both make acquiring companies there 
harder or easier. Many of America’s alliances have been long standing and companies from their 
allies have had access to the American market for much longer than companies from Cold War 
adversaries. This means that these companies could potentially face a greater likelihood of antitrust 
actions as they may already have a large portion of the American market in some industries. 
Alternatively, these companies would not face as much distrust when attempting to acquire 
companies in certain industries related to the energy, telecommunications, and military 
infrastructure of America. 
 Recent anecdotal evidence would tend to suggest that international acquisitions may take 
longer due to national security concerns. Currently, CFIUS is holding up at least 55 transactions 
started in 2016. Of these transactions, 28 are from companies headquartered in G7 countries and 
27 are being attempted by Chinese buyers (Donnan, 2017). This is extending that amount of time 
that it might take for these deals to close or affecting the likelihood that they will even close to 
begin with. If these deals that are reviewed by CFIUS typically do not close they would not have 
as much of an impact on overall deal closing times. 
 Given that economic cooperation is viewed as a force for peace, it is expected that whether 
or not a foreign acquisition is from an allied or non-allied country will have no bearing on the 






 Data was collected from several different sources. All transactional data was collected from 
the Thomson Reuters Eikon database, consistent with the data used in other papers (Dikova et al, 
2010 & Zhou et al, 2016). The database derives its information from several different sources 
including international and US media, filings with both domestic and foreign regulators, and trade 
publications. This includes deal values, industries of both the acquirer and target companies, 
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announcement and completion dates for the acquisition, and the country of the acquirer in the case 
of foreign buyers. Announcement and deal completion dates were then used to calculate the 
amount of time that it took for a deal to close. This data pull provided transaction data for 466 
completed foreign acquisitions and 2,972 acquisitions that were completed by domestic American 
companies during the years 2000-2015. Interesting to note here, is that of the foreign acquisitions 
only 19 were from the BRIC countries which could be due to the evidence presented by Zhou et 
al that acquisitions from emerging markets to a developed economy (in this case America) are 
more likely to fail than acquisitions going the other way. Anecdotally, their hypotheses of the 
negative affect foreignness could also be detrimental to the closing time of an acquisition, with 
Chinese acquisitions of American companies taking longer on average than any other country’s 
acquisition (see Appendix 1 for a breakdown of statistics by country). On average foreign 
acquisitions from the sample required approximately 127 days to complete and domestic 
acquisitions required approximately 133 days to complete which is notably higher than the findings 
of Dikova et al. The medians observed in the data set collected for this paper were also higher than 
those observed in previous papers with the median for foreign acquisitions being 102 days and the 
median for domestic acquisitions being 112 days compared to medians observed by previous 
literature of 62 (Muehlfeld et al, 2012). However, several factors could be contributing to this 
difference such as the fact that their paper focused on transactions made between companies from 
2 developed economies and also focused on transactions in only one industry IB services. There 
is no direct comparison to the data collected for this paper and that used in the Dikova et al paper 
as that paper relied on SIC industry breakups while this paper relies on the industry divisions 
determined by Thomson Reuters, however please refer to Appendix 2 for breakdowns of averages 
by industry. 
 Different from the previously mentioned papers, the only deals pulled from the database 
were those with a value greater than $50 million, where the percentage sought in company being 
acquired was 100%, and the company was a publicly-listed. This is in contrast to many of the 
previously mentioned papers that used public company status and percentage sought as control 
variables. These parameters were chosen as public companies would be more likely to have a more 
widely publicized intermediary phase (the period between deal announcement and completion) 
than those of acquisitions of a private companies and acquisitions of entire companies would be 
more likely to attract regulatory scrutiny than acquisitions of smaller ownership stakes. Also unlike 
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the papers by Muehlfeld et al and Dikova et al which focus on specific industries (the global 
newspaper industry and the IB services industry respectively) this data set was intended to focus 
on a specific target company country instead (America). This in addition to the fact that the range 
of years used for this paper included 2 recessions (the Dot-com Bubble and the 2008 Financial 
Crisis) could be the reason that the averages and medians observed in this paper’s dataset are above 




 All trade related data for the years 2000-2015 was collected from the US Census Bureau, 
which came in the form of total exports by month and year for America and a break down of those 
totals with every country that America trades with. This in turn was then used to calculate the total 
balance of trade for each of America’s trading partners for each year and which was then used to 
create a matrix that organised trade balances by country and year. For the purposes of the 
regression analysis for each international deal, a matrix lookup was performed to determine what 
percentage of the American trade deficit the acquirer’s country was responsible for in the year the 
acquisition was announced. 
 
Foreign Policy Dummy Variable 
 
 Lastly, data for the foreign policy dummy variable was collected. This included collecting 
a list of countries that are part of the NATO alliance (from the NATO website) and those countries 
that have been designated by America as Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA), which was found on 
the Cornell Legal Information Institute website. The hypotheses put forward by Zhou et al that 
companies from emerging economies trying to acquire large stakes in companies in developed 
economies tended to run into national security concerns lends support to looking into the foreign 
policy implications of M&A. Especially as all of the origin countries (the BRIC nations) studied 
in that previously reviewed paper are not considered to be allies in American foreign policy. 
However, the fact that these companies are less likely to succeed in their merger attempts could 
lead to a bias in that the only successful acquisitions left in the sample would be those that would 





 All of these data points were then used to create several regressions with an example 
regression appearing as such: 
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑦 
 
 Deal Size: The overall size of the transaction being completed (in millions of dollars). 
 Same Industry: Dummy variable if the acquirer and target operate in the same industry. 
 Trade: Variable based off the percentage of America’s total deficit that the acquirer’s 
country is responsible for in the year of the acquisition. For example, for a Japanese company 
pursuing an acquisition in 2012 this value would be 10.47%. This is because America’s total trade 
deficit in 2012 was $730.4 billion, while its trade deficit with Japan that year was $76.5 billion. 
 Ally: Dummy variable if the acquirer’s nation is an American ally either through being in 




 Firstly, is there a statistically significant difference in the average amount of time that it 
takes for an international deal to close compared to a domestic one. To determine this a z-score 
was calculated to determine a probability for the overall and industry averages. The formula for 
the test statistic comparing to means was (Rumsey, 2017): 
 
 Note that the subscript 1 denotes the values for foreign acquisitions and subscript 2 denotes 
the values for domestic acquisitions. Using the calculated averages and standard deviations from 
Appendix 2 resulted in the test statistics and p-values seen in Table 1. Even given a relatively 
conservative level of 𝑝 < 0.05 the only industry where acquisition length is statistically different 
is in Financials and the length of time it takes to complete a deal is actually shorter in that industry 
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for an international company. As previously noted the sample includes the time period of the 
financial crisis and this could have been helpful to foreign financial institutions trying to enter the 
American market. Regulators were struggling to shore up bad banks in the economy and foreign 
financial institutions would have maybe had more capital than their American counterparts (which 
owned a lot of subprime debt) to provide capital to other struggling financial institutions. In the 
overall economy the results are in line with the proposed hypothesis that deals will take 






 To test the remaining hypotheses several regressions were ran, table 2 provides a brief 
summary of the results of all the different models that were tested (full regression results are 








Target Industry z p-value
Consumer Products and Services 0.25 0.3869
Consumer Staples 0.06 0.3983
Energy and Power 0.39 0.3699
Financials -2.92 0.0056
Healthcare -0.95 0.2539
High Technology 1.56 0.1189
Industrials 0.77 0.2959
Materials 0.49 0.3539
Media and Entertainment 0.09 0.3972








 The Dependent variable as seen in the sample formula in the Data section is the number of 
days it took to complete a successful transaction. In the base model only two independent variables 
are used and those are the deal size and whether or not the Acquirer and Target company are in 
the same industry. Neither model explained a large portion of the variation in deal completion 
times for both foreign and domestic acquisitions. The R2 for the domestic model was 0.0477 
compared to an R2 of 0.0528 for the foreign acquisition model, meaning that these two variables 
of “Deal Value” and “Same Industry” explain very little of the variation in deal completion times 
for these acquisitions. Given a 95% confidence interval both variables were in line with the 
hypotheses set out for domestic acquisitions, in that a larger deal size and whether or not companies 
operated in the same industry both increased deal completion times for domestic firms. The affects 
these variables had were also shown to be statistically significant with p-values for both “Deal 
Value” and “Same Industry” being less than .05. However, with 95% confidence it could not be 
accepted that the “Same Industry” variable was below 0 for acquisitions by international buyers as 
the p-value is well above .05, which differs from results noted in prior research (Li et al, 2016). 











Intercept 114.8756315 112.2586368 106.2449654 100.4912098 93.91637673
3.0124E-285 3.8135E-35 1.26543E-30 1.31617E-16 1.86511E-14
Deal Value 0.002726853 0.005181422 0.005296487 0.005167277 0.00528318
1.22116E-27 2.63177E-07 1.23869E-07 2.7523E-07 1.28229E-07
Same Industry 17.79884026 3.332616932 2.391021948 2.539217572 1.553155351






R-Squared 0.047684601 0.052757587 0.065142127 0.054903546 0.067672509
*p-values are in italics
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and this could be due to the fact that the sample collected was from a later period in time than that 
used by Li et al (1990-2012) and more foreign firms as a result could already have a greater 
exposure to American markets in this time period and thus be more prone to anti-trust involvement 
in proposed acquisitions. Overall, deal value had a greater impact on the closing time of foreign 
acquisitions than it did for domestic acquisitions and the opposite was true for company pairs in 
the same industry. 
 The next hypothesis that was tested was whether or not perceptions of economic 
competitiveness between the acquirer country and the target country could play a part in extending 
the length of time that it took for an acquisition to close. This was examined through the lens of 
trade deficits. As can be seen from Model 3 for every 1% increase of America’s total trade deficit 
coming from the acquirer’s country in the year of the announcement the deal would take 1.85 days 
longer to close. This beta is also statistically significant given 95% confidence which provides 
evidence in support of the view that perceptions of economic competition plays a part in lawmaker 
and regulator decisions to more thoroughly review foreign acquisitions. This implies strong 
evidence that perceptions on trading relations with other countries could slow down closing times 
for companies that come from countries that America holds large deficits with in line with the 
proposed hypothesis. 
 Whether or not the acquiring company is from an allied or non-allied country seems to 
have no statistically significant bearing on the amount of time that it takes to close a deal in line 
with the theory proposed in the hypothesis. From the results seen in Model 4 it actually seems to 
evidence that deals being pursued by companies from Allied countries actually seem to take longer. 
This weak positive number could be due to a difference in review outcomes when regulatory 
bodies like CFIUS get involved in international acquisitions. If companies from allied countries 
are more likely to pass CFIUS review they still need to cope with the waiting time that the review 
entails and that would add more time to the deal closing process for them and thus impact the 
results of any regression. If companies from non-allied countries are more likely to face CFIUS 
rejections that would not impact the outcomes of the regressions that were ran. 
 When it comes to deal completion times for foreign firms, the affects of the above variables 
had never been tested before. The above models show that the deal value and trade are statistically 
significant in affecting the completion times of deals. However, their impact alone does not explain 
much of the variation in deal completion times. The ways in which they affect deal completion 
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times are unlikely to be correlated with previously tested values in the Dikova et al paper, which 
included distances in legal/regulatory frameworks and the past learning experience of acquirers. 
Negative perceptions of deficits were shown to have a statistically significant impact on deal 
completion times unlike the affect seen by bilateral trade in previous research (Li et al, 2016). The 
results are also quite different from past results as deals in all industries were looked at, whereas 
most prior papers had looked at deals within specific industries. Differences in deal complexity 
between industries that have either more tangible or intangible assets could also play a role in deal 
completion times and increase the overall variation and standard deviation compared to deals in 




 The above results show that even though there is no statistically significant difference in 
deal completion times between foreign and domestic firms acquiring companies in America 
different factors affect the length of time these deals need to complete. The size of the deal seems 
to have more of an impact on deal completion times for foreign firms. Foreign firms also seem to 
get less scrutiny when acquiring companies in the same industry than their domestic counterparts. 
This may be due to the fact that these deals aren’t seen to impact the competitive landscape within 
industries. 
 Perceptions of economic competitiveness might also give regulators some pause before 
allowing a deal originating from a country that America already has a large trade deficit with. 
Although there is evidence that foreign direct investment has some benefits of increasing total 
factor productivity there are also costs. The literature suggests domestic firms are the last firms to 
benefit from productivity increases and that acquirer countries often benefit through outward 
foreign direct investment by exporting even more. This could in turn give lawmakers and 
regulators more reasons to hold up deals or disallow them outright. 
 The results also show that whether or not the country of the acquirer is an ally of America 
has no statistically significant bearing on deal closing times. However, this could also be due to 





Appendix 1: Statistics on Days to Completion by Country 
 
 
Country Sample Size Average σ
Argentina 3 105.67 18.82
Australia 14 170.64 147.30
Austria 2 91.50 9.19
Bahamas 1 52.00 0.00
Belgium 4 159.25 51.56
Bermuda 14 115.00 68.91
Brazil 3 149.67 5.51
British Virgin Islands 1 37.00 0.00
Canada 95 133.36 127.23
Cayman Islands 1 112.00 0.00
China 6 215.17 158.66
Cyprus 1 103.00 0.00
Denmark 5 81.20 24.83
Finland 6 131.00 89.16
France 32 124.31 77.64
Germany 30 161.77 115.48
Hong Kong 3 189.67 147.36
India 4 54.00 22.76
Israel 12 115.17 53.95
Italy 11 154.64 99.44
Japan 29 114.41 75.27
Mexico 4 73.75 41.44
Netherlands 33 105.18 76.04
New Zealand 2 88.50 3.54
Norway 1 85.00 0.00
Poland 1 79.00 0.00
Republic of Ireland 8 84.50 90.11
Russian Federation 6 117.33 88.67
Singapore 4 138.75 43.35
South Africa 3 107.00 63.02
South Korea 2 80.00 33.94
Spain 14 196.00 117.03
Sweden 14 73.43 38.97
Switzerland 18 125.72 80.97
Taiwan 1 50.00 0.00
United Kingdom 78 120.68 92.29
Grand Total 466 126.78 99.31
Days to Completion by Country
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Target Industry Sample Size Average σ
Consumer Products and Services 187 101.39 60.81
Consumer Staples 93 122.60 81.05
Energy and Power 213 174.69 115.17
Financials 675 169.25 86.98
Healthcare 349 109.33 71.37
High Technology 599 98.17 60.79
Industrials 209 115.33 78.10
Materials 110 128.71 85.08
Media and Entertainment 133 178.68 139.06
Real Estate 135 124.02 56.62
Retail 141 117.94 84.61
Telecommunications 128 153.77 108.73
Overall 2972 132.52 89.03
Domestic Acquisition Days to Completion
Target Industry Sample Size Average σ
Consumer Products and Services 27 104.70 65.81
Consumer Staples 27 123.56 77.01
Energy and Power 36 185.78 164.39
Financials 55 144.98 56.34
Healthcare 98 101.00 78.04
High Technology 88 112.17 81.15
Industrials 31 126.77 76.76
Materials 55 139.27 148.25
Media and Entertainment 14 181.79 115.55
Real Estate 10 105.40 34.90
Retail 12 101.75 59.99
Telecommunications 13 159.62 105.17
Overall 466 126.78 99.31
International Acquisition Days to Completion
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df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 1137961.175 568980.5873 75.38236764 0
Residual 2969 22409794.45 7547.926725
Total 2971 23547755.62
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 114.8756315 2.840510146 40.44190149 3.0124E-285 109.3060634 120.4451996
Deal Value 0.002726853 0.000247772 11.00548189 1.22116E-27 0.002241031 0.003212676








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 260630.8642 130315.4321 13.94931353 1.31037E-06
Residual 463 4325377.37 9342.067753
Total 465 4586008.234
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 112.2586368 8.331548319 13.47392255 3.8135E-35 95.88630391 128.6309697
Deal Value 0.005181422 0.000991562 5.225517308 2.63177E-07 0.003232903 0.00712994
Same Industry 3.332616932 9.779447635 0.340777624 0.733425571 -15.88498415 22.55021802
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df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 326402.1127 108800.7042 11.80060408 1.84399E-07
Residual 462 4259606.121 9219.926669
Total 465 4586008.234
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 106.2449654 8.577686987 12.38620219 1.26543E-30 89.38884956 123.1010812
Deal Value 0.005296487 0.000986 5.371691216 1.23869E-07 0.003358886 0.007234087
Same Industry 2.391021948 9.721701795 0.245946852 0.805832602 -16.71321111 21.495255








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 279750.8248 93250.27494 10.00442448 2.12342E-06
Residual 462 4306257.409 9320.903483
Total 465 4586008.234
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 100.4912098 11.6945348 8.593006185 1.31617E-16 77.51013894 123.4722807
Deal Value 0.005167277 0.000990487 5.216905714 2.7523E-07 0.003220859 0.007113695
Same Industry 2.539217572 9.784058522 0.259526 0.795345029 -16.68755344 21.76598858
Ally 15.68662384 10.95254362 1.432235687 0.1527526 -5.836351281 37.20959897
21 
 

























df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 347126.5682 86781.64206 9.437946172 2.4357E-07
Residual 461 4238881.666 9194.971075
Total 465 4586008.234
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 93.91637673 11.86650324 7.914410405 1.86511E-14 70.59723571 117.2355177
Deal Value 0.00528318 0.000984704 5.365244478 1.28229E-07 0.003348114 0.007218245
Same Industry 1.553155351 9.724563842 0.159714654 0.873175809 -17.55681082 20.66312153
Ally 16.33552028 10.88094437 1.501296185 0.133963569 -5.04687613 37.71791668
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